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H.W. Arthurs'

A Lot Of Knowledge is a
Dangerous Thing: Will The
Legal Profession Survive the
Knowledge Explosion?

Professor Arthurs argues that with the growth and diversification of knowledge,
the common body of knowledge that underpins a unified profession is becoming
more difficult to sustain. The desire to know, the need to know and the resources
to know have divided lawyers into subprofessions, increasingly defined by the
non-lawyers with whom they work and the clienteles they serve, bound togetherif at all-only by nostalgia and some residuum of self-interest.

I am going to be saying some difficult things tonight about Canada's legal
profession, and by extension about its members, Who are fine, principled
men and women, good citizens, and according to traditional standards of
what lawyers should know and do, obviously able and knowledgeable
people. I will say these things, I assure you, with affection and respect,
even though what I say may disturb lawyers, law students and legal
academics.
Essentially, I will argue that we are in the midst of a fundamental shift
in the nature of legal knowledge which may in the end fundamentally
transform the legal profession. If we end up with any kind of common
professional future, it will likely be as a congeries or collection of
subprofessions clustered around different kinds of knowledge, bound
together-if at all--only by nostalgia and some residuum of self-interest.
And finally, I will suggest that the new contours of legal knowledge are
clues to the location of fault lines along which our relationships with our
clients and society may also fracture.
Let me begin at the beginning: what does it mean to speak of law as a
profession? There is a good deal of controversy in the literature about
whether there is any such creature as a profession, about whether a
profession is simply an occupation with pretensions or, as Shaw maintained, a conspiracy against the laity. But even the most sceptical
sociologist acknowledges, as we ourselves often contend, that the Bar's
claim to professional status, privileges and rewards stands or falls on the
assertion that lawyers know things which other people do not.

1. Professor of Law & President Emeritus, York University. The Wickwire Lecture, Dalhousie
Law School, November 24, 1994.
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Because we have special knowledge, our clients are dependent on us.
Because they are dependent on us-so the argument runs-we have an
ethical responsibility to use our knowledge in their interest. Because
members of a profession are uniquely knowledgeable about the special
area of human activity in which they are engaged, they alone are able to
judge whether their fellow-professionals have treated their clients competently and responsibly. Because they alone can judge-the argument
continues-members of a profession are also uniquely qualified to
legislate standards for admission to practise and for continued enjoyment
of the right to practise.
Because the profession is to perform all of these important functions,
it must be able to create structures within which proper professional
practises can be defined, disseminated and enforced: hence our claim to
be self-governing. And finally, because each profession has a monopoly
over a certain kind of knowledge, and the sole right to determine on what
terms that knowledge will be made available, like all monopolists we owe
the public a correlative obligation to ensure that the legal system is
working as well as possible, and in the public interest. Here is the root of
whatever title we may have to be the custodians of legal aid, law reform
and the rule of law.
All of this is pretty standard stuff. You will hear it in after dinner
speeches; you will read it in the social science literature. If nothing else,
I hope you will at least agree that knowledge is central to the very notion
of professionalism. If you do not, I am in some difficulty, because that is
the central thesis of my lecture. If you do, we are all in some difficulty,
because-as I have suggested-we are in the midst of a profound change
in the nature of legal knowledge.
Well then, what do lawyers know? John Willis, one of the wisest men
I ever met, spent one of his lives reincarnated as a legal practitioner in
Nova Scotia. He coined a motto for his law firm: "We know everything;
we do anything; we stop at nothing." "We know everything": vintage
Willisonian irony that, and characteristically to the point. Practising
lawyers are indeed licensed to "do anything", a privilege which, given the
logic of professionalism, necessarily implies a claim to "know everything". To know what? To know real estate and criminal law, company
and municipal law, income tax and the Charter; to know how to advocate,
negotiate, strategize and draft; to know about advising large banks and
small businesses, quarrelling spouses and nervous testators, governments and protest groups.
And more yet. We are supposed to know about the mechanics of
legislation and adjudication. We are supposed to be ethicists capable of
working out difficult moral dilemmas-our own, and those of our clients.
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We are supposed to be fluent in the epistemology and semiotics of law,
so that we can continue to decipher its mysteries as they are handed down
in monthly tablets from the Supreme Court of Canada. And-not finally,
but finally enough-we are supposed not only to know all these things at
any given moment, but to keep our knowledge current over careers which
might last thirty or forty years or more.
Have I made my point? In plain English, the claim of any given lawyer
to know all the things she or he is supposed to know is bound to be vastly
overstated. And so, alas, is the collective knowledge claim of the
profession.
Sometime toward the end of the nineteenth century, legal professions
all over the common law world began to come to grips with this disturbing
revelation. They began to worry about creating a true "science of law",
and about education and training for practitioners of that science. Harvard
showed the way in the United States and Dalhousie in Canada; even
England began to talk of establishing a legal university. But these early
initiatives soon ran their course, and here we are, a century on, and not yet
seriously addressing the issue.
Medicine, by contrast, understood at least from the time of the Flexner
Report in the 1920s, that it had to be well-grounded in the natural
sciences. It understood at least from the 1940s that it was deeply
implicated in fundamental political and economic conflicts, including
such wrenching controversies as Nazi medical experiments and the
establishment of the British National Health Service. And by the 1960s,
medicine began to understand that knowing how to treat illness was
ultimately far less important than grappling with the genetic, social and
environmental determinants of health.
I do not mean to romanticize the medical profession: quite the
contrary. Medicine has got itself into a compounding series of crises
which no one would wish upon the Bar--certainly not I. But I do want to
say that it is long past time that lawyers started to take knowledge
seriously-especially knowledge of law as a social system.
Research in law's equivalent of natural science is negligible, and what
does take place receives scant attention and even less approval or support
from the practising profession. Nonetheless, we still go on amending
constitutions and enacting legislation and making judicial pronouncements as if we had even the slightest evidence that doing so might produce
any results at all, let alone those we are trying to achieve. Attempts to
acquaint law students with the social causes and consequences of lawand they are valiant attempts, at most law schools-tend to be greeted
with glazed looks and blank screens: does not contribute to the bottom
line; does not compute. This is still a profession, I am sorry to say, which
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devalues systemic knowledge, the institutions which produce it, and the
potential of such knowledge to contribute to the well-being of society
and, ultimately, of individual clients. In fact, it is a profession which
apparently felt so uncomfortable with knowledge that until 1974, it was
not even prepared to state publicly that lawyers could be disciplined for
not having it or using it. Only with the adoption of the Canadian Bar
Association Code of Professional Conduct did we begin to legislate
against professional incompetence and-if I may put it this waylegislating should never be confused with actually doing something.
Which is not to say we know nothing. Lawyers-well-educated,
modem lawyers-have a considerable stock of technical knowledge,
information about legal rules and procedures. Our current problem is to
manage the exponential growth of this technical knowledge, and to fit it
into intellectual structures and information systems which will make it
accessible, reliable, coherent and, ultimately, useable.
Modem lawyers, like their nineteenth century forbears, also generate
and use a great deal of what might be called craft knowledge-practical
information and techniques which are of the essence of legal practise:
how to deal with a difficult witness? how much to charge a client? what
sort of arguments are likely to work with a particular judge? what
constitutes state-of-the-art boilerplate in a securities prospectus or an
estate plan? This craft knowledge is common property, and is largely
tacit. It is defined and validated by an unstated consensus about what
constitutes "good lawyering", and transmitted through apprenticeship,
mentoring and collegiality. However, given that professional consensus
is dissolving and professional collegiality is waning, the future of craft
knowledge as common property must be regarded as uncertain at best.
Thus we do have problems in dealing with technical knowledge and
craft knowledge. But our greatest difficulties arise in the sphere of
systemic knowledge. We know very little about law as a system for
distributing justice, resolving disputes or allocating economic benefits
and burdens. Ironically, however, what we know least about is becoming
more and more important. Let me offer two examples.
First, the Charter. No one would deny that the Charter seeks to enhance
the rights and freedoms of all Canadians. But it is far from clear that
having more rights and freedoms makes any difference at all in the real
world. Women, aboriginal peoples, accused persons and others have won
some famous victories in the Supreme Court. But do we actually know
whether their lives are better than they were in 1982 when the Charter was
adopted? If their lives are better, do we know whether these improvements are the result of Charter victories, rather than of social and political
changes, similar to those which occurred over the past dozen years in

A Lot Of Knowledge is a Dangerous Thing

countries which do not have a Charter? And can we measure the benefits
of Charter victories against the possible costs-not financial costs
particularly, but costs such as the effect of Charter litigation on parliamentary democracy, on the effectiveness of government, and on our
capacity for social mobilization!
I ask these questions only partly to provoke. Mostly, I ask them to make
the point that we know very little about the actual effects of Charter
decisions. And we ought to know more-much more. A recent, controversial American study2 suggests that such famous victories as Brown v.
Board of Education3 and Roe v. Wade4 did not produce the positive
outcomes which the victors claimed and we have all assumed. To the
contrary, school segregation increased and abortions decreased following these two landmark decisions. If this study is sound, is it wise for socalled Charter groups to place such emphasis on litigation as a strategy for
emancipation and social transformation?
Let me take quite a different example in the field of civil justice. Some
years ago, Quebec established the Montreal Small Claims Court, a novel
institution intended to enhance access to justice for ordinary citizens. To
guarantee that the Court would achieve its purposes, corporations were
prohibited from suing and lawyers from pleading. However, a recent
study5 shows that one third of all claims in this court are initiated by
professionals seeking to recover unpaid fees, and fully half of those are
claims by lawyers suing on their own behalf. In general terms, the docket
and clientele of the Montreal Small Claims Court are not what was
intended, and most ordinary citizens apparently continue to take their
disputes elsewhere.
Clearly, we ought to be asking some questions: why did this noble
experiment fail? or indeed did it fail? was there ever an unmet need for
formal adjudication of small claims? whose small claims? for what? and
how satisfactorily are such disputes now resolved, by whom and for
whom, and according to what criteria?
Although we are "learned in the law", lawyers can hardly begin to pose
these questions because we lack a conceptual framework which accommodates models of dispute resolution other than formal adjudication; and

2. G.N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1991).
3. 74 S.Ct. 686 (1954).
4. 93 S.Ct. 705 (1973).
5. Prof. R.A. Macdonald of McGill University and his colleagues have been documenting the
work of the Montreal Small Claims Court in a series of studies, several of which are en route
to publication. See e.g. S.C. Maguire & R.A. Macdonald, "Wizards of Oz: Judicial Scripts in
the Dramaturgy of the Small Claims Court" (1995) Can. J.L. & Soc. [forthcoming].
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we cannot develop credible answers because of the almost total deficit of
background information about the social statistics of civil justice.
Now, one could fairly say: "These are big questions, systemic questions: how should we enfranchise groups which have been marginalized
by Canadian society? how should we make justice more accessible to
people who cannot afford the cost and wear and tear of litigation in the
superior courts? These big, systemic questions," lawyers might say, "are
not for us. We do not have to know about them in order to advise our
clients. These are questions for politicians, civil servants, academics, and
editorial writers."
All true, to a degree. But many lawyers do advise clients on just such
matters, Charter litigation being the prime case in point. Lots of lawyers
do become civil servants, academics, editorial writers, politicians-even
premiers; and as a profession, we collectively pontificate on precisely the
issues about which we profess individual ignorance and no need to know.
To borrow the medical metaphor again: we would be outraged if an
internist or allergist-let alone the College of Physicians and Surgeonswere to tell us that they have no reliable evidence to indicate whether
standard procedures and commonly prescribed medicines will make us
better or worse.
I want to urge, then, that--collectively and individually-we lawyers
should know a great deal more than we do about whether the legal system
works, and if so, how and why. If we do not acknowledge our need to
know, if we do not learn how to know, we run a well-deserved risk of
being ignored in any situation where systemic knowledge is pertinent. I
am not just talking about public policy debates or Charter litigation. I am
talking about all aspects of the practise of law, other than routine paper
processing which is now mostly done by clerks or paraprofessionals or by
lawyers functioning well below the level of their professional
qualifications.
My first point, to summarize, is this. We are in the midst of a crisis
which encompasses the creation, management, transmission and validation of all forms of lawyers' knowledge-technical knowledge, craft
knowledge and systemic knowledge. This crisis affects our ability to
serve our clients and to serve society.
And to come directly to my second point, as we attempt to solve this
crisis, we are going to find it extremely difficult to maintain our collective
identity as a profession.
Before explaining this second point, let me deal with one possibility:
that we can avoid the crisis of knowledge by promoting delegalization. In
theory this is possible: society might opt for less law rather than more;
people with grievances might opt for less reliance on lawyers rather than
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more; lawyers might opt for less power, influence and affluence rather
than more. All possible in theory; all developments for which there is a
great deal to be said; if I were in charge of the world, delegalization might
have a fighting chance. But somehow, I doubt that I will be or that it does.
Hence we must proceed on the assumption not that we are going to
have less law, but rather that we are going to have more. This entails the
further assumption that more law will mean not just more of the same, not
just more legal knowledge overall, but also more highly differentiated
knowledge pertaining to specific areas of social and economic life. How
will the profession deal with this change in the quantity and quality of
legal knowledge?
Essentially, we have two choices: either we will continue to insist that
lawyers can and should know everything, or we will accept that lawyers
must become expert in some fields of knowledge and know very little
about others.
The first choice is not a practical one. There are intellectual limits to
what each of us is able to know, and more importantly, there are practical
limits to what any of us needs to know and can afford to know. Attempts
to make us all omnicompetent are doomed. Until we admit and act on this
fact, we will continue to make false claims about what we know, continue
to offer bad advice to clients and society, and worst of all, continue to
delude ourselves about our own capacities and contributions. In short, we
will implode intellectually.
On the other hand, if we pursue the second option, if we expand and
diversify our collective store of knowledge, we will trigger a knowledge
explosion as dramatic as the exptosion of the Mont Btanc in Hatifax
Harbour-and quite possibly as destructive.
Here is what will happen. Our collective knowledge will increase
exponentially, but we will each be able to know less and less of the whole.
Some of us will take hold of one part of legal knowledge, and others of
quite a different part. And which of us will know what? Three rationing
principles will come into play: first, the desire to know-for those of us
privileged to lead academic careers; second, the need to know-for those
who practise law; and third, as amongst practitioners-the material
resources to know, those having access to the greatest resources knowing
the most.
These three rationing principles have already been at work for some
time, dividing us more and more in terms of what we know, and causing
us less and less to perceive ourselves as members of a single profession
with common interests and values. As a corollary, however, we are
developing greater and greater affinities with members of adjacent
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professions, and new affiliations and identities built around shared
configurations of technical, craft and systemic knowledge.
Let me try to show how each of the three principles produces these
results, and what the effects might be for the future of the profession.
To begin, the desire-to-know principle has produced serious divergences between the academy and the practising Bar. To offer you a
thumbnail history of Canadian legal education, law teaching was once
dominated by part-time lecturers who epitomized the values, knowledge
and preoccupations of the practising Bar. Today, legal academics look
pretty much like other university professors, with similar credentials,
career patterns and reward systems, with a similar psychopathology of
participation in faculty unions and university administration, and with
essentially similar intellectual interests.
Precisely because of these intellectual interests, the law teachers' drift
away from the Bar and towards academe is likely to accelerate. The
reason is that systemic knowledge-in which law teachers specializeis growing in importance. On the one hand, we are experiencing the
legalization of almost everything: politics, the family, business transactions, land use and employment relations. On the other hand, however,
society is becoming increasingly concerned about the value, consequences and costs of these legal interventions. Inevitably, we are going
to be asked whether law can indeed produce what society wants and needs
at a price it can afford-a question which can only be answered by new
and better systemic knowledge.
And where is that knowledge going to come from? If legal practitioners were in the habit of asking such questions, if they even had the means
of asking them, the Bar itself might provide credible answers. But such
questions cannot be answered without the aid of concepts and data
borrowed from other disciplines--economics, for example, or sociology.
Consequently, law professors--especially those with interdisciplinary
training-are going to assume the burden of response.
Then it's down the slippery slope: the more we work across disciplinary boundaries, the greater the change notjust in what we know but in how
we know it, not just in our fund of systemic information, but in our
epistemology. In other words, we will be thinking less like lawyers and
more like sociologists or economists. But we are not just thinkers
ourselves; we are teachers; we influence the thinking of future generations of lawyers. Thus, over time, we will gradually transform the deep
structures of traditional legal knowledge, and destabilize the professional
culture which is built upon those structures. In practical terms, this means
that we will begin to change how lawyers think about the source and
nature of legal authority, about what constitutes a persuasive argument,
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and especially about themselves as autonomous and individualistic
actors, rather than as participants in a system. These changes are likely to
affect the arguments new lawyers make in court, the way they relate to
senior partners and judges, and the career patterns they adopt.
We can already see the early effects of this process. Senior-and notso-senior-practitioners are often surprised and occasionally alienated
by what recent graduates regard as legitimate forms of professional
knowledge--especially by "radical" forms of knowledge. They do not
quite know what to make of law and economics or rights discourse, let
alone feminist or critical theory. Well, to put the matter very simply, this
is the "desire-to-know" principle at work: lawyers closest in time and
space to the academy will know some things; those farthest away will
know other things.
What about the "need-to-know" principle which also rations legal
knowledge? The principle rests on the bedrock truth that time is money.
Busy lawyers will spend the time to learn what they need for their practise,
but generally speaking, will not bother with knowledge or technique for
which they have no apparent use. In effect, important groups of lawyers
function in knowledge-based sub-professions-specialists and generalists, house counsel and academics, clinic lawyers and government
lawyers. And these sub-professions tend to develop very different perspectives on important issues of professional conduct and governance.
Thus the need-to-know principle both derives from and reinforces the
long-term trend towards specialization in practise, a trend more advanced
in some places than others, but as clearly visible in Halifax as in Toronto
or Boston.
To some extent, the crucial link between specialized knowledge and
specialized practise has been formally recognized. For example, the
Canadian Bar's Code of Professional Conduct explicitly acknowledges
that the standard of performance expected of any individual practitioner
should be measured against his or her role in practise and the special body
of knowledge required for that role. The Code of Professional Conduct
imposes a duty "to keep abreast of developments in the branches of law
wherein the lawyer's practise lies", to cease to act for a client "if it
develops that the lawyer is not competent to handle the matter", and in
appropriate cases to "retain, consult or collaborate" with a legal specialist
or "experts in scientific, accounting or other non-legal filtds." 6
A quick check of discipline reports suggests that not one of Ontario's
lawyers has fallen below the required standard of specialized knowledge

6. Law Society of Upper Canada, ProfessionalConductHandbook (Toronto: Law Society of
Upper Canada, 1992) rule 2, paras. 5 & 6.
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over the past few years-or perhaps the fact that almost no one has been
disciplined for lack of knowledge suggests that the Law Society is unable
to formulate or apply operational standards of competence. Whichever is
true, it is still important to note that the Bar Association, and the
governing bodies which have adopted its Code of Professional Conduct,
have formally acknowledged the link between specialized practise and
specialized knowledge.
But specialization and the need-to-know principle have not been
universally welcomed. Indeed, they pose an obvious threat to traditional
notions of legal culture. This may explain why legal professions-and
law schools-are so diffident about specialization. This diffidence is
visible in the denigration of specialized, and especially systemic, knowledge in academic and professional training, in the slow progress towards
the credentializing of specialists, and in the inability of governing bodies
to devise appropriate regulatory arrangements for "boutique" firms,
specialist departments, and inter-professional partnerships.
Nor is this diffidence unwarranted. Divisions amongst the branches of
professional knowledge have indeed produced conflicts amongst professional constituencies. For example, during the 1970s, Errors and Omissions insurance became mandatory, and rapidly increasing premium
costs forced many provincial governing bodies to become self-insurers.
As self-insurers, they came rapidly to understand the need to reduce
claims and raise the standards of practise. This generated a flood of
regulatory initiatives: continuing education programs-first voluntary,
then mandatory; practise advisory services; soon, perhaps, competence
audits and re-testing and re-licensing of all lawyers at periodic intervals.
These initiatives, in turn, have provoked some of the most divisive
controversies in recent professional history. They are costly; they are
intrusive; they are threatening; and they are being resisted. Young
lawyers, for example, argue vehemently that they are unable to pay everincreasing Law Society fees and continuing education cogts. Indeed,
some of them have been forced out of practise. Litigation specialists
object strenuously to having to pay the same insurance premiums as
conveyancers, because litigation gives rise to very few claims. Some of
them are muttering darkly about refusing to pay.
Specialized knowledge has also been used by contending groups
within the profession as the basis of their efforts to control professional
markets and resources. For example, criminal law specialists in Ontario
have argued that their skill and expert knowledge earns them a prior claim
on whatever is left of the provincial legal aid budget. Of course, amongst
other explanations for the depletion of legal aid budgets is the fact that
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those very criminal lawyers have used the Charter and other knowledgebased strategies to up the ante of criminal trials and appeals.
The use of knowledge to control markets makes specialists vulnerable
to sudden obsolescence, due to changes in substantive law. Thus, the
introduction of no-fault automobile insurance knocked the bottom out of
the market for plaintiffs' lawyers. This, no doubt, caused many of them
to shift into the adjacent civil litigation market, the nearest field in which
their knowledge capital could be reinvested with a minimum loss of
value. As they did so, they would surely have encountered some resistance and resentment from established general litigation firms.
Finally, knowledge does not simply separate specialists from nonspecialists; it also links them more closely with non-lawyers. A recent
study has shown how labour lawyers and personnel experts together
constructed modem "employment law".7 A similar story could be told, I
suspect, about real estate lawyers collaborating with developers and
planners, about wills and estates lawyers working closely with banks and
trust companies, about tax lawyers cooperating with accountants. The
extreme case would be lawyers who leave private practise for other work
settings which require them to redefine the intellectual content and
practical direction of their daily work. This group includes high-powered
corporate lawyers who become corporate executives, and at a more
mundane level, the one member in four of the Law Society of Upper
Canada who is now employed outside of private practise.
All of these collaborations and interactions have a centrifugal effect on
the legal profession: the loyalties and identities of many lawyers are now
being shaped more by the knowledge nexus which they share with nonlawyers, and less by the professional culture which they share with fellow
members of the Bar.
To sum up the "need-to-know" principle, individuals in different
professional roles acquire very different kinds of professional knowledge
including, often, knowledge shared with non-lawyers rather than lawyers. Knowledge thus becomes the defining characteristic of each branch
of the profession, but it is also a divisive characteristic. Knowledge
shapes claims to professional privileges and market positions, and
sharpens conflicts over professional interests, identities and ideologies.
Now, finally, I want to turn to the third of the "rationing principles"
which links lawyers in different practise roles with specific profiles of
legal knowledge-the principle that knowledge will be distributed to
those who possess "the resources to know". To state the principle very

7. L.B. Edelman, S.E. Abraham & H.S. Erlanger, "Professional Construction of Law: The
Inflated Threat of Wrongful Discharge" (1992) 26 Law & Soc. Rev. 47.
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crudely and unsubtly: lawyers can only afford to know what their clients
can afford to pay for. Thus, the economic dimension of practise tends to
shape the professional ideology, ethical preoccupations and symbolic
behaviours of individual practitioners. As someone inelegantly observed,
you are who you eat.
In principle, of course, all lawyers have equal access to any part of the
corpus of legal knowledge, to advance their clients' interests and their
own career prospects. Some lawyers, however, seem to have more equal
access than others. This is both a cause and an effect of the stratification
of the profession revealed by many American studies8 and apparently
confirmed by English9 and Canadian studies.1"
Strata within the legal profession are marked off from one another by
the affluence of the clientele they serve, by the character, extent and
intensity of knowledge required to serve that clientele, and by distinctive
patterns of professional recruitment and socialization peculiar to each
stratum. Generally, lawyers in the "upper stratum" tend to be specialists;
those in the "lower" tend to be generalists. Both tend to have the
knowledge which their clients can afford, which is to say that specialists
have more and generalists less.
Thus specialists, and others in the upper stratum, tend to practise in
large firms, serve affluent corporate and institutional clients, work on
complex and/or important legal tasks, enjoy privileged work environments, employ large staffs, have considerable capital invested in their
offices and equipment, are very well paid, and enjoy considerable
prestige within and beyond the ranks of the profession. And, because
there is some principle of divine retribution at work, they also experience
considerable stress and disaffection.
Generalists are mostly found outside the charmed circle these days.
They tend to handle more mundane and routine matters, often for small
businesses or individual clients; they practise in humbler surroundings;
and they make less money. Consequently, they have--or at least useless knowledge, because their clients cannot afford more. Obviously
there are qualifications, exceptions and intermediate cases. For example,
8. J.E. Carlin, Lawyers on Their Own: A Study of Individual Practitionersin Chicago (New
Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1962); Lawyers' Ethics: A Survey of the New York City Bar
(New York: Russell sage, 1966); J. Heinz & E. Laumann, Chicago Lawyers: The Social
Structure of the Bar (Chicago: American Bar Foundation, 1982); J. Ladinsky, "The Social
Profile of A Metropolitan Bar: A Statistical Survey in Detroit" (February 1964) Mich. State
B.J. 12.
9. R. Abel, The Legal Profession in England and Wales (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988).
10. J. Hagan, M. Hunter & P. Parker, "Class Structure and Legal Practice: Inequality and
mobility among Toronto Lawyers" (1988) 19 Am. J. of Political Sci. 9; D. Stager & H.W.
Arthurs, Lawyers in Canada(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989).
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some generalists belong to a sort of professional gentry; they practise
profitably, and are often leaders in community and professional organizations. But all too many generalists, especially those who practise alone
or in small partnerships in metropolitan areas, have become members of
what has to be called a professional proletariat.
Given the stratification of the profession, to allocate knowledge on the
basis of who has the resources to know is to affect prejudicially both
clients and lawyers who come from disadvantaged groups in our society.
It is fairly well-known, I suspect, that someone charged with welfare
fraud, is unlikely to get the same quality of defence as someone charged
with stock fraud. Someone moving into a corner store is likely to be
signing an off-the-shelf lease form; someone about to take over five floors
of a downtown office building is likely to be putting their signature to a
considerably more complex document. That too is well-known. But it is
somewhat less notorious that lawyers who defend welfare recipients and
arrange storefront leases display very different demographics from those
who defend stock brokers and arrange the affairs of corporate landlords
and tenants.
I am sure we all agree that it ought to be otherwise, and we might even
agree that there are some signs of change. But the fact is, elite firms have
not been equal opportunity employers. Women, members of visible
minorities and First Nations, mature students, and other individuals from
disadvantaged or marginal backgrounds have not been recruited in
proportion to their talents. As a consequence, people from these groups
are over-represented in the profession's middle ranks and especially its
proletariat.
Thus stratification creates, perpetuates and reinforces anomalies and
injustices concerning access to legal knowledge. The most sophisticated
and rewarding work is assigned not on the basis of ability, but on the basis
of status. Some very able lawyers are unlikely to be able to use their
knowledge and abilities to their fullest, because their poor or middle class
clients cannot afford to pay them for hours of research or custom-made
transactions. And of course, these same clients consequently fail to
benefit from the full range of legal knowledge relevant to their needs
because their lawyers cannot afford to deploy such knowledge.
Nor are the effects confined to the outcomes of individual cases. The
production of legal knowledge does not take place evenly across the
profession: much of it tends to be concentrated in the upper echelons.
Assembling sociological evidence about the effects of discrimination or
developing arguments for or against proposed legislation is a costly
business; one normally needs a wealthy client to pay for studies, surveys,
consultants and the like.
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Moreover, the construction of novel legal arguments or instruments
built on technical knowledge-legal rules and commentary found in law
reports, texts and journals-is also much easier for elite firms with elite
clients than it is for the legal proletariat and its poor clients. Elite firms can
afford to maintain large libraries, hire librarians, deploy students and
juniors to sift and summarize information, assign especially difficult or
novel cases to skilled in-house research departments, and draw upon the
knowledge and experience of senior lawyers in their specialist departments. Solo practitioners and small generalist firms simply cannot match
this well-financed, highly trained and tightly organized knowledge
machine. The results of all of this are that elite lawyers are much more
able to influence legal innovation, presumably in ways which benefit
their clients.
Nor, alas, will the computer level the playing field. Initial hardware
costs, installation fees, and especially time charges for searches, can be
born much more easily by rich firms and rich clients than by poor ones.
Even assuming financial barriers to computer access were somehow
reduced or eliminated, the very volume of information delivered by
computer searches is the cause of further distortions. Large, affluent law
firms can afford to follow up computer-generated leads; poor, small firms
cannot. In short, the advent of on-line searches will not guarantee equal
access to legal knowledge, much less fair legal outcomes. On the
contrary, the growing importance of computers may even reinforce
existing tendencies within the profession to an unequal distribution of
capital, power, knowledge, clienteles and rewards. Soon we may have a
two-tier profession: those who can afford to log on and those who cannot.
The picture is not entirely one-sided. We have tried to counter the
regressive effects of the resources-to-know principle by providing funding through legal aid, specialized clinics, the federal Court Challenges
program, and litigation-minded community groups with focused interests and resources sufficient to afford expert legal representation. All of
these have the same ultimate objective: to permit legal knowledgeespecially expensive systemic knowledge-to be used by lawyers acting
on behalf of individuals and interest groups who would otherwise be
seriously disadvantaged in litigation. But by and large, poor litigants and
their proletarian lawyers are likely to be out-gunned in the knowledge
wars. That is the pernicious aspect of the "afford to know" principle.
Let me now sum up. Central to the very notion of a profession is the
existence of a common body of knowledge which binds its members
together, and which defines the profession's relationship to clients, to the
state, and to other groups in society. In the case of the legal profession,
belief in the existence of such a common body of knowledge is reflected
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in our continued adherence to a single model of education and training,
a single practise credential, a single code of professional ethics, a single
standard of competence, a single constituency of electors for the governing body, a single catalogue of professional honours, a single repertoire
of professional regulatory strategies.
But with the growth of knowledge and the diversification of knowledge, that common core has ceased to exist. The desire to know, the need
to know, the resources to know have divided us into subprofessions
clustered around differing bodies of knowledge. Furthermore, these
subprofessions are increasingly defined by the non-lawyer collaborators
with whom they work, and the particular clienteles they serve. As a
consequence, the notion of a single unified legal profession is becoming
increasingly less plausible.
Finally, differences in the knowledge needed and used by different
types of lawyers generate a series of fault lines which run deeply through
the profession, sometimes running parallel to and sometimes cutting
across other fault lines generated by differences in class and generation,
race and gender, clientele and geography. These fault lines come to the
surface in debates over professional issues such as mandatory CLE,
annual dues and assessments, legal aid, advertising and proposals to limit
entry to practise. They help to explain variations in professional lifestyles,
voting in benchers' elections, debates over the authority of the governing
body, public controversies over pending legislation, and conflicts over
economic interests.
And, to pursue my geological metaphor to its inexorable-if melodramatic-conclusion, since the source of these fault lines is a shift in the
tectonic plates of professional knowledge, they may ultimately provoke
a volcanic explosion-streams of intellectual lava, mudslides of knowledge, a sooty shower of expertise. The legal profession may soon share
the fate of Pompeii--or Halifax.

